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Executive Summary 2 
“Light is the best of disinfectants; the most efficient policeman.” 
US Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis (1914)  
Policy is only as good as the information at the disposal of policymakers. Few moments illustrate 
this better than the uncertainty before and after the default of Lehman Brothers and the subsequent 
decision to stand behind AIG. Authorities were forced to make critical policy decisions, despite 
being uncertain about counterparties’ exposures and the protection sold against their default. 
Opacity has been a defining characteristic of over-the-counter derivatives markets – to the extent 
that they have been labelled “dark markets” (Duffie, 2012). Motivated by the concern that opacity 
exercerbates crises, the G20 leaders made a decisive push in 2009 for greater transparency in 
derivatives markets. In Europe, this initiative was formalised in 2012 in the European Markets 
Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), which requires EU entities engaging in derivatives transactions to 
report them to trade repositories authorised by the European Securities Markets Authority (ESMA). 
Derivatives markets are thus in the process of becoming one of the most transparent markets for 
regulators. 
This paper represents a first analysis of the EU-wide data collected under EMIR. We start by 
describing the structure of the dataset, drawing comparisons with existing survey-based evidence 
on derivatives markets. The rest of the paper is divided into three sections, focusing on the three 
largest derivatives markets (interest rates, foreign exchange and credit). 
In Section 2, we look at interest rate derivatives, which represent around three quarters of the 
gross notional of all derivatives markets. The market is large because of widespread demand for 
interest rate risk management: as part of their business model, banks typically borrow at short 
maturities and lend long, while insurers and pension funds borrow long and lend short. Consistent 
with this hedging motive, we find that banks’ interest rate derivative portfolios increase in value 
when interest rates rise, while those of insurers and pension funds decrease. A set of dealers, 
including some large banks, intermediate between end customers; these dealers therefore take 
small net positions vis-à-vis interest rate risk despite maintaining large gross portfolios.  
In Section 3, our focus shifts to credit default swaps (CDS). Unlike interest rate derivatives, few 
single-name CDS contracts are centrally cleared, meaning that CDSs transfer counterparty (as well 
as fundamental) credit risk. The market is highly concentrated: most trades relate to a few 
reference entities, which in turn account for a large share of gross notional. Dealers occupy the 
lion’s share of transactions and associated net and gross notional. Overall, the dealers have a 
small net/gross ratio, reflecting their intermediation role. Other financial institutions (including hedge 
funds and mutual funds), non-financial corporations, as well as insurance and pension funds are 
generally net buyers of protection.  
Finally, in Section 4, we analyse foreign exchange derivatives. Foreign exchange derivatives, 
which mostly comprise forward contracts (either outright forwards or forwards as part of a swap 
agreement), are not centrally cleared, in contrast with many interest rate derivatives. Compared 
with credit derivatives, the foreign exchange derivatives market is relatively decentralised. Most 
trades involve at least one bank, but many of these trades take place with non-financial 
counterparties. FX derivatives therefore allow NFCs to hedge unwanted foreign exchange risk, and 
constitute a closer link between the financial system and the real economy than interest rate or 
credit derivatives.  
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Introduction 3 
The derivatives market – once one of the most opaque financial markets in the world – is in the 
process of becoming one of the most transparent to regulators. In Pittsburgh in September 2009, 
G20 leaders committed to requiring all over-the-counter derivative contracts to be reported to trade 
repositories, which make the data available to relevant authorities. In the EU, this commitment is 
implemented in the European Markets Infrastructure Regulation.1 Since 2014, counterparties 
resident in the EU (including central clearing counterparties) have been required to report the 
details of new and outstanding derivatives transactions to trade repositories. EMIR grants the 
European Systemic Risk Board and European Securities and Markets Authority exclusive access to 
the full EU-wide dataset. 
The derivatives market is voluminous and heterogeneous; transaction-level data on derivatives are 
therefore highly complex. Various problems associated with the structure of the datasets and the 
quality of reporting compound this inherent complexity. Grappling with this complexity is a 
substantial project with a high expected payoff: analysis promises to shed light on the hitherto 
“dark” OTC derivatives markets (Duffie, 2012), and ultimately to inform macroprudential 
policymaking. This paper represents a first step in that direction. 
The purpose of this paper is to describe the groundwork in terms of data analysis that has been 
conducted in view of three medium-term policy objectives: 
• The first objective is to improve policymakers’ understanding of the functioning of the 
derivatives market. Before the G20’s initiative in 2009, the derivatives market was notoriously 
opaque. On 15 September 2008, for example, there was significant uncertainty regarding the 
net volume and distribution of credit protection written by and referenced on Lehman Brothers 
(Scott, 2014). In a retrospective analysis of the causes of the crisis, the US Federal Crisis 
Inquiry Commission (2011) concludes that the “Federal Reserve realised far too late the 
systemic danger inherent in the interconnections of the unregulated OTC derivatives market 
and did not have the information needed to act”. This lack of information impaired 
policymakers’ effectiveness in 2008. With transaction-level derivatives data, today’s 
policymakers are better equipped. 
• The second objective is to identify possible sources of systemic risk. In derivatives markets, 
systemic risk is determined by the interplay between market risk, counterparty risk and 
liquidity risk, and the distribution of these risks across market participants. Combining 
information about counterparties’ exposures to risk factors with counterparty-level data can 
therefore help regulators to identify key sources of systemic risk (Duffie, 2014). In derivatives 
markets, activity is typically concentrated around a relatively small core of major dealers, 
which generates systemic fragility with respect to distress at a dealer bank (Langfield, Liu and 
Ota, 2014). The new transaction-level derivatives data provide policymakers with the 
opportunity to analyse these sources of systemic risk. 
                                                          
1  See Art. 9 of EMIR. Other jurisdictions have introduced similar provisions, including the US (via Title VII of the Dodd-
Frank Act). According to the Financial Stability Board (FSB), as of June 2016, 19 out of 24 FSB jurisdictions had in force 
trade reporting requirements, covering more than 90% of OTC derivative transactions (FSB, 2016). 
Section 1 
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Introduction 4 
• The third objective is to inform the development of macroprudential policies. Policies can be 
applied with respect to institutions or activities. In terms of institutions, cross-sectional 
macroprudential policy should focus on the distribution of market risk, counterparty risk and 
liquidity risk across derivatives market participants; time-varying macroprudential policy should 
focus on the build-up of such risk in good times. Excessive concentrations or accumulations of 
risks can be addressed via charges or outright limits. In terms of activities, macroprudential 
policymakers could consider the scope of mandatory central clearing (to address counterparty 
risk) and restrictions on margins or haircuts (to address liquidity risk) (Clerc et al, 2016). 
Analysis using transaction-level derivatives data can help to inform the design, selection and 
calibration of such macroprudential policies. 
1.1 Overview of the EMIR dataset 
According to EMIR, all EU-located legal persons (counterparties) entering into a derivative contract 
must report the details of that contract to a trade repository (TR) authorised by ESMA. At the time 
of writing, the authorised trade repositories are CME, DTCC, ICE, KDPW, Regis-TR and UnaVista.2 
These six TRs provide daily data to over 60 institutions in the EU, which have access to the data 
pertaining to their respective jurisdiction. The ESRB and ESMA uniquely have access to the full 
EU-wide dataset. 
The EMIR data cover all derivatives classes 
(including credit, commodity, equity, interest 
rates and foreign exchange) and encompass 
trades cleared by central clearing 
counterparties (CCPs). Both OTC and 
exchange-traded contracts are subject to the 
reporting requirement. Around 85 variables are 
reported for each transaction (see Tables 1 
and 2). These include information on 
counterparties; details on the characteristics of 
the contract (e.g. type of derivative, underlying, 
prices, amount outstanding); how and on which 
venue the contract was executed or cleared; valuation and collateral; and life-cycle events (e.g. 
whether the observation pertains to a new contract, a modification or revaluation of an old contract, 
or termination). 
Such comprehensive reporting under EMIR implies huge data volumes. By the end of 2015, 27 
billion records had been received and processed by the six TRs in the EU, averaging around 330 
million records per week (ESMA, 2015a). Furthermore, the reporting obligation is imposed on all 
EU counterparties, rather than on a subset of market players. It therefore provides the first 
complete picture of the EU derivatives market. 
                                                          
2  The full names of the six authorised trade repositories are CME Trade Repository Ltd. (CME); DTCC Derivatives 
Repository Ltd (referred to hereafter as “DTCC”); ICE Trade Vault Europe Ltd. (“ICE”); Krajowy Depozyt Papierów 
Wartościowych S.A. (“KDPW”); Regis-TR S.A. (“Regis-TR”); and UnaVista Limited (“UnaVista”). DTCC Derivatives 
Repository Ltd is one of four subsidiaries of the DTCC Global Trade Repository (DTCC GTR), which is a global TR with 
worldwide operations. 
Table 1 
Overview of counterparty variables reported 
under EMIR 
Counterparty (CP) data 
Reporting timestamp 
Counterparty ID, name, etc - both for the reporting entity, and for the  
counterparty of the reporting entity 
Corporate sector of the CP 
ID of broker, beneficiary, etc. 
Counterparty side (buyer/seller) 
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Table 2 
Overview of contract variables reported under EMIR 
Contract type Clearing 
Product and underlying IDs 
Notional/deliverable currencies 
Clearing status 
Clearing obligation 
Clearing timestamp 
CCP ID 
Transaction details Interest rates 
Trade ID (UTI) 
Execution venue / timestamp 
Maturity / settlement / termination 
Information on price, notional, type of delivery. 
Fixed rate / floating rate 
Payment frequencies 
Day count convention 
Reset frequencies 
Risk mitigation / reporting Foreign Exchange 
Confirmation means and timestamp Exchange rate 
Exchange rate basis 
Forward exchange rate 
Collateral Commodities 
Portfolio code 
Collateral value 
Commodity base 
Further details on energy deriviatives 
Modificatios to the report Options 
Action type 
New 
Modify 
Error 
Cancel 
Compression 
Valuation update 
Option type / style 
Strike price 
 
1.2 Comparison with the Bank for International Settlements’ survey 
The semi-annual survey of the OTC derivatives market by the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS) provides basic information and a benchmark against which to compare aggregate volumes 
from the new EMIR dataset. Compared to EMIR’s comprehensive coverage, the BIS surveys a 
limited set of derivative dealers, which report their aggregate derivative positions on a global 
consolidated basis, including the positions of their foreign affiliates (after netting intra-group 
positions). About 70 major derivative dealers from 13 countries participate in the BIS’ semi-annual 
survey; despite the limited sample, the semi-annual survey captures a large portion of the global 
OTC market (BIS, 2013 and 2015).3 
The BIS survey provides information on the relative importance of each derivative class in the OTC 
market (Chart 1). As of end-2015, by far the most important derivative class in terms of notional 
amount of outstanding contracts is interest rates derivatives (around 78%), followed by foreign-
exchange derivatives (14%) and credit derivatives (3%). In Section 2, we focus on interest rate 
derivatives owing to their predominance in the wider derivatives market. In Section 3, we turn to 
credit derivatives, which played a key role in the 2008-09 financial crisis. In Section 4, we look at 
foreign exchange derivatives, which represent a relatively under-studied segment of the derivatives 
market. 
                                                          
3  Comparison of the aggregates obtained from the BIS semi-annual survey with those from the BIS triennial survey, which 
covers many more institutions (around 400) from many more countries (47), suggests that the market share of semi-annual 
reporters is about 97% for interest rate and credit derivatives. Still, neither survey covers positions between two non-
reporting entities. By contrast, EMIR covers all EU-resident entities. 
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According to the BIS survey, the total notional of 
outstanding OTC interest rate derivatives 
globally stood at €353,303bn at end-2015; that 
of credit derivatives €11,310bn; and that of 
foreign exchange derivatives €64,810bn. 
Throughout this paper we use EMIR data 
retrieved from DTCC, the largest trade 
repository. Our sample covers 70%, 73% and 
61% of these BIS aggregates for interest rate, 
credit and FX derivatives respectively (see 
Table 3). This partial coverage of the global 
market is reasonable given that EMIR reporting 
requirements apply only to EU-resident entities, 
and in light of DTCC's partial market share. On 
the other hand, EMIR’s comprehensive 
coverage of EU-resident entities – compared 
with the subset of global market players 
surveyed by the BIS – biases upwards the 
relative magnitude of EMIR aggregates.4 
Table 3 
EMIR data from DTCC compared with the BIS’s global OTC derivatives survey 
(notional amounts outstanding) 
 Interest rate derivatives Credit derivatives Foreign exchange derivatives 
EMIR data from DTCC, EU 
aggregate 
€247,428bn €8,291bn €39,629bn 
BIS semi-annual survey, global 
aggregate 
€353,303bn €11,310bn €64,810bn 
Ratio (EMIR/BIS) 70% 73% 61% 
Source: DTCC OTC interest rate, credit and foreign exchange derivatives datasets (based on the 02/11/15 trade state report) and BIS semi-annual 
OTC derivatives survey from end-2015. 
Note: DTCC aggregates are obtained from Tables 4, 7 and 11 as the sum of the “final values” at the bottom of each table plus all observations in the 
lower part of the table below "Non-LEI counterparties" (excluding intra-group positions).  
                                                          
4  Other considerations should be borne in mind when comparing BIS and EMIR aggregates. First, the consolidation 
perimeter differs: the BIS survey is conducted on a global consolidated basis, whereas intra-group trades in the EMIR data 
are identified by an intra-group flag reported under EMIR, which we further complement with information on global ultimate 
ownership from Orbis (see section 1.4). As an example of the potential difference, in statistical and supervisory data 
collections from banking groups, the consolidation perimeter can refer to broad economic scope including insurance 
corporations or to the prudential scope, which excludes insurance corporations. Second, there are minor differences in 
product classifications: for credit, the BIS survey covers only credit default swaps, whereas EMIR includes all credit 
derivatives; the BIS survey classifies some cross-currency interest rate swaps as foreign exchange derivatives, whereas 
EMIR records them as interest rate derivatives. Third, the discrepancy in the reporting date – BIS data are valid as of 
31/12/15, whereas EMIR data refer to 02/11/15 – may play a minor role. See Fache Rousová, Kulmala and Osiewicz 
(2015) for a fuller discussion of the differences between BIS and EMIR data. 
Chart 1 
Notional shares of OTC derivative classes 
 
Note: “CR” denotes credit derivatives, “FX” denotes foreign- exchange 
derivatives, “IR” denotes interest rate derivatives, and “OT” indicates 
other classes, including commodities and equity-linked derivatives.  
Source: BIS semi-annual OTC derivatives survey (end-2015) and 
authors’ calculations. 
CR
FX
IR
OT
ESRB 
Occasional Paper Series No 11/ September 2016 
 
Introduction 7 
1.3 EMIR data from DTCC 
The existence of multiple trade repositories – each of which receives and processes a subset of 
data reported under EMIR – poses a challenge for ESMA, the ESRB and other authorities to 
access, manage and analyse EMIR data, particularly in comparison to other jurisdictions that have 
adopted a single TR (HKMA, 2015). In Europe, on a daily basis, each trade repository generates 
multiple reports of different types, and has done so since the start of reporting in February 2014. 
The number, content and structure of the reports varies across trade repositories.  
In general, all trade repositories are obliged each day to provide the relevant authorities with details 
on all new trades and modifications of outstanding trades, which were reported to them by 
counterparties on the previous day. This information is contained in so-called “trade activity” 
reports. In addition, most TRs provide a “trade state” report, which contains transaction-level 
information on the stock of all outstanding contracts at a given date. This report is derived by TRs 
by accumulating data from all past trade activity. This information is crucial from a macroprudential 
perspective, but is not (yet) a mandatory requirement under EMIR. 
DTCC is the largest trade repository in terms of 
market share. In interest rate derivatives, DTCC 
covers 53% of the market (Chart 2), but the 
extensive use of central clearing in Interest rate 
derivatives inflates the relative market share of 
UnaVista, which receives most CCP reports. In 
most cases, the counterparties to these 
centrally cleared trades report to DTCC, 
meaning that DTCC’s coverage – after “de-
duplicating” the data – is more extensive than 
implied by its 53% market share. 
In OTC credit derivatives, DTCC has a larger 
market share of 80% (Chart 3), and its market 
share in FX derivatives stands at around 66% 
(Chart 4).5  
In light of DTCC’s broad coverage of interest 
rate, credit and foreign exchange derivatives, 
this paper focuses on derivatives transactions 
reported to DTCC. In parallel, efforts are underway within the ESRB to merge DTCC’s dataset with 
those of other trade repositories in order to achieve a more complete coverage of the derivatives 
market. In this respect, ESMA’s work to improve the harmonisation of data across TRs – 
particularly with respect to variable names and data quality – is crucial. 
                                                          
5  The chart stands at 66% based on average over the period from January to August 2016. The share increases to over 75% 
when using data from the two most recent months (July and August 2016). The significant increase in the DTCC's share 
can be attributed to a sharp downward correction observed in June 2016 in the data published by UnaVista.  
Chart 2 
Market shares of trade repositories in OTC 
interest rate derivatives 
 
Note: Based on the average notional amount of open trades for each TR 
over the period January-August 2016.  
Source: Trade repositories’ public data. 
CME
DTCC
ICE
KDPW
REGIS
UnaVista
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Chart 4 
Market shares of trade repositories in OTC 
foreign exchange derivatives 
 
Note: Based on the average notional amount of open trades for each TR 
over the period January-August 2016. 
Source: Trade repositories’ public data. 
DTCC provides regulators with more than 40 separate files each day, which are organised as 
follows: 
• 4 types of report – including trade state, trade activity, trade modifications, counterparty 
positions and collateral;6  
• 2 types of venue – either over-the-counter or exchange-traded; 
• 5 types of underlying – including all main derivative classes (rates, equity, credit, FX, 
commodities). 
In addition, DTCC provides further reports on collateral and rejection rates due to non-compliance 
with the reporting rules. 
1.4 Improvements in data quality 
Since the advent of the EMIR reporting obligation in February 2014, data quality has significantly 
improved. To illustrate this, Chart 5 plots the time series of the share of missing observations on 
several key variables. Steps by ESMA to improve data quality have been instrumental in driving this 
downward trend in the share of missing observations; most notably, the introduction of Level 1 
validations by trade repositories in December 2014 led to a significant reduction in the number of 
missing observations. 
                                                          
6  The trade state report provides transaction-level information on the stock of all outstanding contracts at a given date. The 
trade activity report provides information on new transactions – including compressions of extant contracts, complicating 
the identification of genuinely “new” trades. The modification report provides details on daily modifications to existing 
contracts. The counterparty position report provides aggregated data at the counterparty level (e.g. gross bilateral 
exposures for a given asset class/instrument type). The collateral report provides information on the market value of 
collateral used at the counterparty and collateral portfolio level. 
CME
DTCC
ICE
KDPW
REGIS
UnaVista
Chart 3 
Market shares of trade repositories in OTC 
credit derivatives 
 
Note: Based on the average notional amount of open trades for each TR 
over the period January-August 2016.  
Source: Trade repositories’ public data. 
CME
DTCC
ICE
KDPW
REGIS
UnaVista
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Another data quality issue relates to 
reconciliation of both sides of the same trade. 
To this end, ESMA has put forward guidelines 
regarding the definition of an interim unique 
trade identifier (ESMA, 2015b), pending a global 
unique trade identifier (UTI) defined by the 
Committee on Payments and Market 
Infrastructures (CPMI) and the International 
Organisation of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO). UTIs serve two purposes. First, two 
observations on the same trade facilitate an 
additional quality check; in some cases, we are 
able to use the superior data quality of one 
observation to improve the quality of the 
duplicated observation – underscoring the utility 
of EMIR's double-reporting obligation. Second, 
by successfully matching two sides of the same 
trade, it is possible to obtain a more precise “de-
duplicated” quantification of total gross notional 
in a given market. 
EMIR data only contain information on the characteristics of each derivative transaction. 
Information on counterparties, for example, is limited. However, EMIR’s use of the legal entity 
identifier (LEI) permits us to merge the derivatives data with external data that contain counterparty-
level information. In particular, we merge the derivatives data with data from Bureau van Dijk’s 
Orbis dataset and Bloomberg data. This facilitates the generation of useful summary statistics and 
allows us to identify the sector of each LEI at two different levels: the LEI itself, and a global 
ultimate owner for each LEI, based on ownership data from Orbis. The GUO's sector may differ 
from that of LEI, allowing us to conduct a sector analysis at two different levels of aggregation. 
 
Chart 5 
Percentage of missing observations for 
selected variables 
 
Note: This chart depicts the time series of missing observations, 
computed as the mean percentage of missing variables across four 
variables: beneficiary ID, notional amount, effective date, and price 
multiplier. 
Source: ECB calculations based on month-end DTCC trade state 
reports provided to the ECB. 
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Interest rate derivatives (IRDs) constitute the largest segment of the OTC derivatives market, 
accounting for about 78% of total gross notional according to BIS data. Financial institutions use 
IRDs extensively to hedge and speculate on interest rate risk. In view of the importance of IRDs, 
academic attention has recently shifted towards banks’ and other financial institutions’ exposure to 
interest rate risk (Begenau et al, 2015; Gomez et al, 2016). These contributions estimate US 
institutions’ interest rate risk exposures from publicly available data. With granular transaction-level 
data, these estimates can be verified and refined for European banks’ derivatives market activity. 
The OTC IRD market is in transition from a bilateral market to one that is mostly centrally cleared. 
In the US, certain IRDs are subject to a central clearing obligation owing to provisions in the Dodd-
Frank Act (Benos et al, 2016). In the EU, the obligation for certain counterparties to centrally clear 
certain derivatives started being phased-in from 21 June 2016.7 These structural changes mean 
that the current juncture is a particularly insightful time at which to study the IRD market. Looking 
forward, analysis of the IRD market can help to inform the design of macroprudential policy with 
respect to the scope of central clearing obligations. 
2.1 Processing the data 
In this subsection, we describe the steps that we take to transition from the raw trade state report 
from DTCC circa 02/11/15 to one that is fit for analysis. This processing procedure discards 
erroenous observations and hones in on a subset of trades that are standardised and amenable to 
comparison. 
While the IRD market encompasses a wide range of products, including bespoke products tailored 
to specific needs, most market activity is concentrated in a few relatively standardised products. 
Interest rate swaps account for the majority of the stock at around 88%. Among the remainder, 
interest rate options account for 4.9% and interest rate forwards for 3.3%. 
To gain a representative insight into the IRD market, we focus on a specific type of OTC contract: 
the 6M Euribor plain-vanilla fixed-for-floating interest rate swap (IRS). In this subsection, we provide 
an overview of the data processing procedure by which we transition from the raw dataset, which 
includes over six million outstanding contracts, to the subset of such IRSs. 
The processing procedure is described in detail in Table 4. The first column describes the various 
steps followed, while column 2 reports the number of observations discarded at each step. Column 
3 reports the associated gross notional amount that is dropped at each step, and column 4 the 
share of that step in the total gross notional. 
                                                          
7  See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32015R2205. 
Section 2 
Interest rate swaps 
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Table 4 
Statistics of the processing procedure for IRDs 
 # Obs. Notional (€bn) Notional (%) 
Initial values 6,077,028 403,795* - 
Observation dropping    
Implausible values 35,120 -  
No counterparty side 17,424 722 0.2 
Missing mark-to-market value 1,253,677 80,926 20.1 
Duplicates (trade IDs)    
 Inconsistent    
  notional 77,444 4,276 1.3 
  counterparty ID 22,052 1,110 0.3 
  maturity date 14,040 837 0.3 
  intragroup flag 44,420 3,146 1.0 
 De-duplication 352,469 15,648 5.0 
Non LEI counterparties 194,216 6,093 2.1 
Non swaps 514,850 67,977 23.4 
Basis swaps 187,792 10,564 4.8 
Embedded options 5,211 98 0.0 
Spread on floating leg 335,766 27,896 13.1 
Upfront payment 145,577 5,160 2.8 
Cross-currency 71,138 2,360 1.3 
Diff. notional across legs 17,211 1,611 0.9 
Intragroup 773,371 43,609 24.9 
Non Euribor 6M 1,695,446 109,131 82.8 
Final values 319,804 22,631  
Source: DTCC OTC interest rate derivatives dataset (based on the 02/11/15 trade state report). 
Note: The notional amount (in €bn and as a % of the total) for each row is calculated when the respective observations are dropped from the dataset. 
All notional amounts are reported in euro after conversion using exchange rates on 02/11/15. 
* The initial notional amount is computed after observations with implausible reported gross notionals (i.e. greater than €10bn or lower than €1,000) 
are dropped. 
The cumulated steps above the middle horizontal line in Table 4 represent the “cleaning” 
procedure. Observations dropped above this line are either erroneous or redundant. In total, we 
drop 1,306,221 erroneous observations owing to implausible gross notional values (greater than 
€10bn or lower than €1,000) or missing values on the fields related to the “counterparty side” 
(which is crucial for subsequent analysis) or “mark-to-market value” (wherein a missing observation 
suggests that the trade has in fact been cancelled). We then proceed to identify duplicates on the 
unique trade identifier. First, we apply an internal consistency check by dropping observations 
where two reports pertaining to the same transaction are inconsistent with respect to their reported 
gross notional, counterparty IDs, maturity date or intragroup flag. Second, we de-duplicate the data 
by dropping one observation per pair of matched transactions. Finally, we delete 194,216 
observations where at least one of the counterparty identifiers is not an LEI. 
At the middle horizontal line, we are left with a de-duplicated dataset containing non-missing 
observations on 4,066,166 interest rate derivative transactions that were open on 02/11/15. The 
most significant observation loss is caused by the removal of missing mark-to-market values; a 
large fraction of these transactions with missing mark-to-market values are in fact closed trades 
that are erroneously still reported as being alive. As such, we are confident that the 4,066,166 
observations remaining at the first horizontal line in Table 4 cover the vast majority of unique 
interest rate derivative transactions that were open on 02/11/15. 
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Chart 6 depicts the breakdown of this dataset in 
terms of the underlying benchmark rate used to 
determine the payments of the floating leg. Two 
thirds of contracts are referenced on EUR-
Euribor or the three main Libor rates (USD, 
GBP and JPY). Among Euribor contracts, the 
6M tenor accounts for the largest share. For 
subsequent analysis, it is useful to focus only on 
one benchmark type, such that the descriptive 
statistics are internally consistent. We choose to 
focus on plain-vanilla fixed-for-floating interest 
rate swaps referenced on 6M-Euribor, which 
represent the modal type of interest rate 
derivative. 
After the middle horizontal line in Table 4, we 
restrict the dataset accordingly. To this end, we 
drop non-swap interest rate derivatives; basis swaps; swaps with embedded options; swaps with a 
non-zero spread on the floating leg; swaps with non-zero upfront payments; and cross-currency 
swaps. We also discard cross-currency swaps and contracts with different notionals in the two legs. 
Finally, we discard intragroup transactions, using the intragroup flag reported in the EMIR data and 
the global ultimate ownership (GUO) LEI hierarchy provided by Orbis. After applying all of these 
filters, we are left with a dataset comprising 319,804 observations. 
2.2 Summary statistics of processed interest rate swap data 
This section presents summary statistics for the subset of 391,804 observations that are identified 
as plain-vanilla fixed-for-floating 6M Euribor IRS. These summary statistics point to new stylised 
facts regarding the microstructure of the OTC IRS market, thereby providing motivation for future 
research. Given the complex nature of EMIR data, these summary statistics also act as a “sanity 
check” as to whether the main features of the data are consistent with existing survey-based 
knowledge of the OTC derivatives market. 
Approximately one third of IRSs in our six-month Euribor subset are centrally cleared. Charts 7-12 
and Chart 15 are based on the full set of trades, while Charts 13 and 14 and Table 5 present 
separate statistics for centrally cleared and non-cleared trades. 
Under EMIR, all EU-resident counterparties engaging in derivatives trades are required to report 
them to an authorised trade repository. If the two counterparties on each side of the trade are both 
resident in the EU, then both entities report the same transaction. If one is resident outside of the 
EU, the transaction is reported by its EU-resident counterparty, such that we are able to observe 
the non-EU entity. 906 unique EU-resident entities report interest rate swaps to DTCC (see 
Chart 7). These 906 reporting entities report as counterparties a further 5,618 entities – of which 
555 are also reporting entities; 4,551 are EU-resident entities that do not report to DTCC (but rather 
to another TR); and 512 are non-EU counterparties that are not subject to a reporting requirement 
under EMIR. 
Chart 6 
Breakdown of underlying benchmark 
 
Source: DTCC OTC interest rate derivatives dataset (based on the 
02/11/15 trade state report). 
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Chart 7 
Geographical structure of the reporting scheme under EMIR (IRS) 
 
Source: DTCC OTC interest rate swaps dataset (based on the 02/11/15 trade state report). 
Chart 8 plots the distribution of effective dates, which indicate the date from which cash-flows are 
exchanged (as opposed to the execution date, which refers to the date on which the contract is 
agreed). The modal effective date is 2015, reflecting the now common market practice of 
compressing economically redundant trades into new contracts with a smaller gross notional (ISDA, 
2012; Schrimpf, 2015). There is, nevertheless, a long left tail: some outstanding IRSs are several 
years old, and were therefore agreed upon and priced in a very different interest rate environment. 
We also observe a right tail of IRSs that become effective after their execution date; these are so-
called “forward-starting” swaps. 
Chart 9 
Frequency distribution of original maturity 
across trades 
(in years) 
 
Source: DTCC OTC interest rate derivatives dataset (based on the 
02/11/15 trade state report). 
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Frequency distribution of effective date 
across trades 
 
 
Source: DTCC OTC interest rate derivatives dataset (based on the 
02/11/15 trade state report).  
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The time-profile over which cash-flows are exchanged is given by the difference between the 
effective date and the date on which the contract matures. The frequency distribution of these 
original maturities is shown in Chart 9. The distribution is right-skewed: most swaps have an 
original maturity of 10 years or less, but with a long right tail. We also observe bunching at multiples 
of five years – particularly at 5, 10 and 30 years – pointing to considerable standardisation. The 
maximum original maturity is 50 years, corresponding to conventions in fixed-income markets.8 
Chart 10 shows the frequency distribution of original maturities across different sectors. To this end, 
we use information from Orbis in order to assign counterparties to one of the following six groups: 
G16 dealers,9 banks, central counterparties, pension funds and insurance companies, other 
financial institutions (such as mutual and hedge funds), and non-financial institutions.  
The distribution of maturities is similar across sectors – except for insurers and pension funds, 
which have a tendency to use longer maturities. About 20% of IRSs with at least one counterparty 
as an insurer or pension fund have a maturity of 30 years, compared with a global average of less 
than 10%. Insurers and pensions funds are also disproportionately extensive users of IRSs with 
original maturities of 20, 40 and 50 years. Insurers’ and pension funds’ preference for long-dated 
swaps reflects the long duration of their liabilities, which is often so long that insurers are unable to 
buy assets with similar duration, giving rise to a mismatch. The interest rate risk inherent in such a 
duration mismatch can be managed by taking long-dated pay-float positions in interest rate 
derivatives, as we describe in subsection 2.4. 
Chart 10 
Frequency distribution of original maturity across counterparty type 
 
Source: DTCC OTC interest rate derivatives dataset (based on the 02/11/15 trade state report). 
                                                          
8  Note that in a single trade state report the maturity of an IRS and its effective date are not independent due to survivorship 
bias. The fraction of contracts with old effective dates will be larger for long maturity contracts than for short maturities since 
short maturity contracts with old effective dates will have already expired. Also note that the distribution of maturities in the 
daily flow of new contracts will be quite different from the distribution of the stock of outstanding maturities in Chart 9, as 
short maturity IRS are renewed more frequently than long maturity IRS to keep their fraction of the stock constant. 
9  The group of G16 dealers includes Bank of America, Barclays, BNP Paribas, Citigroup, Crédit Agricole, Credit Suisse, 
Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, JPMorgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, Nomura, Royal Bank of Scotland, Société 
Générale, UBS, and Wells Fargo. 
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Chart 11 shows the frequency distribution of gross notional amounts (with uneven bin sizes for the 
sake of presentational clarity). Nearly half of the swaps in the “processed” dataset have a gross 
notional of €10-50m. Approximately 15% of swaps have a gross notional of more than €100m; a 
few even exceed €1,000m. 
Chart 12 depicts the distribution of the interest rate paid on the fixed leg of the IRS. To plot this 
chart, we divide our sample into four periods (according to the execution date of the contract): 
1996-2000, 2001-07, 2008-12, and 2013-15.10 These four periods broadly correspond to different 
interest rate environments: prevailing interest rates in the latter two periods were substantially lower 
than those in the first two periods. We can therefore verify whether the fixed rates are in line with 
what one would expect based on the evolution of interest rates over time. The distribution of rates 
has shifted to the left for contracts with a more recent execution date, which suggests that the data 
quality of the fixed leg variable is reasonable: a negligible fraction of IRSs with an execution date 
between 2013 and 2015 have a fixed leg rate greater than 4%. 
Chart 12 
Distribution of fixed leg rate by execution 
date 
(in %) 
 
Note: This chart does not include forward-starting swaps. 
Source: DTCC OTC interest rate derivatives dataset (based on the 
02/11/15 trade state report). 
  
                                                          
10  By dividing our sample in this way, we introduce “survivorship bias”: the actual average original maturity of contracts 
executed over 1996-2000 or 2001-2007 was lower than might be inferred from the chart. The bias results from the fact that 
we refer only to the trade state report on 02/11/15, which includes outstanding transactions that are open on that date. 
Naturally, transactions that are open on this date but with an execution date several years in the past must have a long 
original maturity. Despite this survivorship bias, Chart 12 provides (to a first order approximation) a reasonable sanity check 
regarding the quality of the reported fixed leg rate. 
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Chart 11 
Frequency distribution of gross notional 
across trades 
 
 
Source: DTCC OTC interest rate derivatives dataset (based on the 
02/11/15 trade state report). 
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2.3 Network properties of outstanding interest rate swap contracts 
Interest rate swaps are traded over-the-counter; it is therefore insightful to investigate the network 
structure of the market. In this subsection, we shed light on “who trades with whom”. 
A first impression of the network density can be 
garnered from the degree distribution across the 
5,969 market participants, where "degree" 
measures the number of unique counterparties 
with which each counterparty trades. We do this 
in Chart 13 for non-centrally cleared trades. 
Fewer than 10% of counterparties have 
outstanding transactions with more than five 
unique trading partners. At the same time, there 
is a long tail of institutions with a large number 
of counterparties. This is in line with the 
common insight that OTC markets can be 
interpreted as a sparse network in which many 
participants trade with the same small set of 
counterparties (Li and Schürhoff, 2014). 
The matrix in Table 5 provides an overview of 
“who trades with whom” in non-centrally cleared 
IRSs based on the counterparty classifications 
obtained from Orbis. Each cell corresponds to 
the gross notional outstanding between two 
sectors, relative to the total gross notional outstanding. Just under three quarters of total 
outstanding notional is concentrated in contracts between G16 dealers and/or other banks. About 
one quarter takes place between dealers or banks and “customers” such as insurance companies, 
pension funds, other financial institutions (e.g. investment funds), non-financial corporates, and 
others (including governments). A small minority of trades take place directly between these 
customers. 
Table 5 
Matrix of share of interactions between market participants, weighted by notional 
Pay Fixed \ Pay 
Float G16 dealers Banks ICPFs Other Finan. Non-financial Other Total 
G16 dealers 19.2% 21.3% 1.7% 5.2% 0.3% 3.4% 51.1% 
Banks 24.9% 7.2% 0.3% 0.7% 0.1% 0.8% 34.1% 
ICPFs 1.4% 0.2% 0.0% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 2.0% 
Other Finan. 4.4% 0.6% 0.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.9% 6.7% 
Non-financial 0.5% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.9% 
Other 3.6% 1.2% 0.0% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 5.1% 
Total 54.0% 30.9% 2.8% 6.7% 0.5% 5.1% 100.0% 
Note: This table includes only trades which are not centrally cleared. "Other" includes governments, central banks and counterparties with an 
unidentified sector. 
Source: DTCC OTC interest rate swaps dataset (based on the 02/11/15 trade state report). 
As we shall see below, activity in the CDS market is similarly concentrated, with 67% of trades 
taking place between G16 dealers and/or banks (see Table 10 in Section 3), but with a larger share 
between G16 dealers (i.e. 30% compared with 19% in the case of interest rate derivatives). The 
Chart 13 
Degree distribution of the IRS network for 
non centrally cleared trades 
F(x ≤X) 
 
Note: This chart does not show the 10 institutions with the largest 
number of counterparties (for presentational clarity). 
Source: DTCC OTC interest rate derivatives dataset (based on the 
02/11/15 trade state report). 
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larger presence of commercial banks and insurers in the interest rate derivative market reflects 
their demand for interest rate derivatives in order to manage interest rate risk on their balance 
sheets. 
We have not constructed a “who-to-whom” 
matrix for centrally cleared trades as this 
requires an ex-post matching of counterparties 
that report a trade with a CCP. This matching is 
non-trivial since the reporting does not keep 
track of the "initial" trading partners of a 
centrally cleared trade, and is therefore left for 
future work. 
Chart 14 simply reports a breakdown of 
counterparties to centrally cleared transactions. 
Centrally cleared trades with a G16 dealer or 
bank as a counterparty account for 
approximately 95% of total centrally cleared 
notional.11  
Visualisation of the outstanding bilateral IRS 
positions can shed further light on the network 
structure of this over-the-counter market. A 
complete analysis of the network properties 
over time and across different IRS is beyond the 
scope of this paper. Instead, to visualise the network, we focus on the subset of plain-vanilla 6M 
Euribor IRSs with a maturity of 10 years. We also collapse multiple trades between two 
counterparties into a single link. Hence, Chart 15 depicts a link between two counterparties if they 
are connected by at least one 10-year Euribor 6M swap contract. This procedure reduces the total 
number of links considerably, allowing us to draw a clearer picture of an important subset of the 6M 
Euribor IRS market. The size of each node in Chart 15 corresponds to a counterparty’s gross 
notional (with a lower bound on node size to ensure that small counterparties are visible). Similarly, 
the width of a link corresponds to the gross notional between two counterparties. As with the node 
size, we apply a lower bound to the width of each link to ensure visibility. The colour of each node 
indicates its sector classification. 
Like Table 5, Chart 15 conveys the insight that G16 dealers are central: they are connected to a 
large number of counterparties, some of which are connected to only a single dealer. Moreover, 
G16 dealers tend to be connected to each other. Some banks also act as central dealers, with 
many connections to each other, G16 dealers, and “customers”. Interestingly, we observe several 
layers of intermediation. Frequently, peripheral nodes do not have direct access to the core of the 
network, but instead access it only indirectly via a peripheral intermediary that is connected to the 
core. 
Furthermore, we see that the most important counterparty (in terms of notional) is a CCP. This 
reflects the fact that approximately one third of the IRS market is centrally cleared, with a single 
                                                          
11  To compute these charts, we simply analyse the transactions with a CCP as a counterparty. Entities that report a CCP as a 
counterparty must be members of that CCP. Our analysis therefore does not tell us how many transactions from non-
members are indirectly cleared via clearing members. 
Chart 14 
Share of total notional of centrally cleared 
contracts by type of market participant 
 
Note: This chart includes only trades which are centrally cleared (in 
contrast with Table 5, which includes only trades which are not centrally 
cleared). 
Source: DTCC OTC interest rate derivatives dataset (based on the 
02/11/15 trade state report). 
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clearing house accounting for about nine out of ten of all centrally cleared trades. This CCP is 
connected to a relatively small number of counterparties.  
Chart 15 
Network of gross notional links between counterparties in a subset of the IRS market  
(based on Euribor 6M interest rate swaps with an original maturity of 10 years) 
 
Note: Undirected unweighted network representation of 10-year plain-vanilla 6M Euribor IRS with a 10-year maturity. Source: DTCC OTC interest 
rate derivatives dataset (based on the 02/11/15 trade state report). 
Chart 15 focuses only on Euribor 6M IRSs with a maturity of 10 years. In order to garner a sense of 
how networks across different underlying benchmarks compare, we compute a similarity measure 
for the full networks of IRS contracts for Euribor 6M and Euribor 3M. Hence, we group all IRS 
contracts with the same underlying benchmark in one network regardless of the maturity of the 
contract. 
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We measure network similarity by the number of links that are present in both the 6M and 3M 
networks relative to the average number of links in both networks. We compute this measure for 
the subset of nodes that are present in both networks. We find that approximately 40% of links are 
present in both networks.12 Similarly, we can compute the average node Jaccard index.13 For a 
node that is present in two networks, the Jaccard index measures how many of the node’s 
neighbours are present in both networks. We obtain a Jaccard index of approximately 49%, broadly 
consistent with our finding regarding network similarity. 
It should be noted that these similarity measures do not pertain to the “global” structure of the 
network. Two networks with low similarity scores may still have similar structures, for example with 
a core-periphery structure and the same set of dealers in the core. In fact, we have verified that the 
core-periphery structure illustrated in Chart 15 is present across different interest rate swap 
underlyings and maturities. We leave a more detailed study of the dynamic and cross-sectional 
properties of the network structure of the IRS market for future work. 
2.4 Interest rate risk across sectors 
Surveys and aggregate market statistics usually refer to derivative exposures in terms of gross and 
net notional. However, these charts have no direct economic interpretation. Two swaps can have 
the same notional and yet have very different sensitivities to changes in interest rates, for example 
due to differences in maturities. In order to calculate a better measure of risk transfer, we compute 
interest rate sensitivities for each individual contract, and aggregate these at the sector level. 
Expectations of future interest rates play a central role in the valuation of interest rate swaps. These 
expectations are captured by the forward curve of the underlying benchmark floating rate. The 
value of an interest rate swap is therefore a function of the relevant forward curve 𝐹(𝑡, τ) with tenor 
τ and contract parameters {𝑃} (such as the maturity or the fixed rate). Here, we compute the value 
𝑉 of an IRS contract using a single-curve valuation model such that 𝑉 =  𝑉�{𝑃},𝐹(𝑡, τ)�. We obtain 
the prevailing market forward curve, 𝐹(𝑡, τ), for the 6M Euribor benchmark from Bloomberg. 
In order to measure interest rate risk, we follow the standard textbook approach – described in 
Sundaresan (2009) – of “PV01”, which denotes the “present value” of a 1 basis point (bp) increase 
in the forward curve.14 The perturbation of a 1 basis point parallel upward shift is an arbitrary shock, 
intended to elicit contracts’ sensitivity to an upward change in interest rates. As a first step, the 
remainder of this section focuses on this arbitrary one basis point parallel shift, but the framework 
that we develop is generalizable to any magnitude of parallel shift, or even non-parallel movements 
in interest rates. 
We therefore compute the interest rate sensitivity of an IRS contract by perturbing the 6M Euribor 
forward curve by ΔF(τ) = 1𝑏𝑏, corresponding to a parallel upward shift in the forward curve. The 
                                                          
12  Specifically, the measure is computed as follows. First, we determine which nodes (i.e. counterparties) are active in both 
the Euribor 6M and Euribor 3M markets. We restrict our computation to this subset of nodes. We then iterate over all edges 
(i.e. trades between two counterparties) in the network of Euribor 6M IRS and check whether the edge is also present in the 
network of Euribor 3M IRS. The similarity measure is then simply the fraction of edges that are present in both Euribor 3M 
and 6M relative to the average number of edges in the Euribor 3M and 6M networks. 
13  The node Jaccard index is defined as follows. For a given node N that is present in network A and B the Jaccard index is 
the ratio of the cardinality of the intersection of the sets of neighbours that node N has in networks A and B relative to the 
cardinality of the union of the sets of neighbours that node N has in networks A and B. 
14  The same measure is sometimes referred to as “DV01”, which stands for “dollar value”. We use the currency-neutral “PV”. 
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perturbed forward curve is then given by 𝐹(𝑡, τ) + ΔF(τ), and we compute the “shocked” value of an 
IRS contract as 𝑉� =  𝑉�({𝑃},𝐹(𝑡, τ) + 1bps). 
We then define PV01 as the contract value when the forward curve is perturbed 𝑉�  minus the 
contract value when the forward curve is unperturbed 𝑉), i.e. 
𝑃𝑉01 = 𝑉�({𝑃},𝐹(𝑡, τ) + 1𝑏𝑏𝑏) −  𝑉�{𝑃},𝐹(𝑡, τ)�. 
We compute this measure across all IRS held by the counterparties in a given sector. We also 
compute a measure of gross interest rate risk, which is the absolute value of PV01. Table 6 
provides this breakdown of interest rate risk in the 6M Euribor swap market at the LEI sector level. 
G16 dealers are most active in the interest rate swaps market, with 204,517 open contracts, with a 
total gross notional of €15,919bn, referenced on 6M Euribor as of 02/11/15. However, their net 
exposure to interest rate risk due to these open contracts is small relative to that borne by other 
sectors. G16 dealers’ net PV01 is negative €21m: smaller (in absolute terms) than the PV01s of 
any other sector. This reflects G16 dealers’ primary role as intermediaries: most of their activity in 
the interest rate swaps market serves to match would-be buyers and sellers of interest rate risk. 
This match-making activity mostly balances out, such that G16 dealers’ residual exposure to 
interest rate risk is relatively small. 
Table 6 
Value of interest rate swaps by sector 
 
No. of contracts 
Gross notional 
(€ bn) % pay-fixed 
Net PV01 
(€ m) 
Gross PV01 
(€ m) 
Net/Gross PV01 
(%) 
G16 dealers 204,517 15,919 47.0 -21 11,528 -0.2 
Banks 194,609 10,927 51.8 245 7,682 3.2 
Insurers and 
pension funds 
7,324 592 38.2 -344 860 -39.9 
Other 
financials 
39,749 2,631 51.9 -39 2,330 -1.7 
Non-financials 7,209 188 83.2 73 141 51.7 
Source: DTCC OTC interest rate swap dataset (based on the 02/11/15 trade state report plain-vanilla fixed-for-floating 6M Euribor IRSs).  
Note: “Other” includes governments, central banks, CCPs and counterparties with an unidentified sector. 
By contrast, insurers and pension funds (ICPFs) use interest rate swaps primarily to manage 
interest rate risk. With considerably fewer contracts than G16 dealers – 7,324, and a total gross 
notional of €592bn – ICPFs nevertheless bear much more interest rate risk. Their PV01 arising 
from 6M Euribor interest rate swaps is negative €344m as of 02/11/15: in other words, the mark-to-
market value of their contracts would decrease by €344m following a one basis point parallel 
increase in the 6M Euribor forward curve. ICPFs’ “short” position in the interest rate swap market 
mirrors their naturally “long” balance sheet exposure to interest rate risk: ICPFs are typically funded 
by liabilities with a longer duration than that of their assets, generating a duration mismatch. Their 
PV01 of negative €344m in 6M Euribor interest rate swaps therefore suggests that much of ICPFs’ 
activity in this market is driven by a hedging motive. 
A similar argument with respect to hedging applies to non-dealer banks. In contrast to ICPFs, 
banks typically fund long-duration assets with short-duration liabilities. Their liabilities therefore 
reprice more quickly than their assets, generating a naturally “short” position in interest rate risk: 
their net worth falls when interest rates rise. This makes banks and insurers obvious counterparts in 
interest rate derivatives. Banks – excluding the G16 group of dealers, which comprise a separate 
category in Table 6 – have a positive net PV01 of €245m in 6M Euribor interest rate swaps as of 
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02/11/15 – almost the mirror image of ICPFs’ net PV01 of negative €344m.15 In this way, the 
derivatives market can in principle facilitate risk-sharing across the financial system. 
Notwithstanding these sector-level insights, there is substantial within-sector heterogeneity in IRS 
activity in certain sectors. Chart 16 helps us to examine within-sector heterogeneity by plotting the 
distribution of the net/gross PV01 ratio by sector. As one might expect, G16 dealers exhibit 
relatively little heterogeneity in their net/gross PV01 ratios: the distribution is concentrated around 
0%, underscoring the conclusion that G16 dealers play an intermediation role in the interest rate 
swaps market, and hold relatively little residual exposure to interest rate risk. In the ICPF sector, 
relatively few firms have near-zero net/gross PV01: most ICPF firms are on the left-hand-side of the 
distribution, reflecting their deeply negative net PV01 exposure. By contrast, the net/gross PV01 
distribution within the banking sector exhibits wide dispersion: some banks have a near-zero 
net/gross PV01, pointing to an intermediation role, but others have a relatively high net/gross PV01 
(with either a positive or negative sign), suggesting that interest rate swaps are used to take 
positions in interest rate risk for these banks. Likewise, the distribution of the net/gross PV01 
statistic across other financial institutions points to substantial heterogeneity within that sector. 
Many other financial institutions place themselves fully on one side of the market with net/gross 
PV01 either negative or positive 1, while a minority have near-zero net/gross PV01 ratios. 
Chart 16 
Unweighted distribution of PV01 net/gross ratio (aggregated at LEI level) 
 
Source: DTCC OTC interest rate derivatives dataset (based on the 02/11/15 trade state report plain-vanilla fixed-for-floating 6M Euribor IRSs). 
                                                          
15  Despite taking similarly large net positions (in absolute terms), banks behave differently to ICPFs in the IRS market. Their 
net/gross PV01 of 3.2% is closer to that of G16 dealers (-0.2%) than ICPFs (-39.9%), suggesting that some banks play an 
intermediary “match-making” role in the IRS market. 
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Chart 17 provides further information on entities’ 
activity (at the individual LEI level) in the IRS 
market according to LEIs’ sector classification. 
The scatterplot correlates entities’ size – 
measured by their total assets – with their gross 
notional in 6M Euribor interest rate swaps as of 
02/11/15. Entities are then classified as a G16 
dealer, bank, other financial institution, ICPF or 
non-financial firm, as in Table 6. As one would 
expect, size is highly correlated with gross 
notional: bigger firms are more likely to be 
active users of interest rate swaps. However, 
this broad insight masks heterogeneity across 
sectors. Some other financial institutions, for 
example, are heavier users of interest rate 
swaps than their balance sheet size would 
suggest. These firms could be using interest 
rate swaps to take proprietary positions on the 
future path of interest rates as part of their overall investment strategy and business model. By 
contrast, some banks are lighter users of interest rate swaps than their balance sheet size would 
suggest. These banks could be retail banks that specialise in taking deposits and granting loans – 
but which lack the sophistication, inclination or incentives to hedge their natural interest rate risk in 
the swaps market. 
Chart 17 
Log gross notional in interest rate swaps 
versus log total assets at LEI-level 
 
Source: DTCC OTC interest rate derivatives dataset (based on the 
02/11/15 trade state report). 
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Credit default swaps represent a widely recognised source of systemic risk in OTC derivatives 
markets (Cont, 2010; Brunnermeier et al., 2013a). They have been closely associated with the 
opacity attributed to derivatives markets in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis.16 The default 
of Lehman Brothers and the subsequent decision to stand behind AIG demonstrate the prevalence 
of this complexity and opacity: Lehman was a major CDS dealer, on which a substantial amount of 
protection had been sold, among others by AIG. At that time, consequential policy decisions were 
taken – despite authorities’ limited knowledge regarding the structure of counterparty credit 
exposures and CDS protection sold.  
An important feature of the microstructure of the CDS market is that it is highly concentrated on a 
small number of counterparties (Brunnermeier et al, 2013b; Peltonen et al, 2014; Kenny et al, 
2016). In addition to this highly concentrated structure, single-name CDS contracts are written on 
counterparties such as dealers. Accordingly, the failure of a major dealer could trigger systemic 
financial distress on two levels: first, its counterparties would incur direct losses; second, CDSs 
written on the dealer would be triggered, leading to severe losses for the protection sellers (Duffie, 
2010). 
Credit default swaps transfer both underlying (fundamental) credit risk and expose participants to 
counterparty risk (Duffie and Huang, 1996; Arora et al, 2012). In contrast with extensive central 
clearing in the markets for IRS and index CDS, most single-name CDSs are not centrally cleared. 
Moreover, despite improvements in CDSs’ standardisation and the widespread use of risk-
mitigation techniques such as compression, outstanding notional amounts from bilateral exposures 
are still large. Therefore, CDSs represent an important source of counterparty risk. Regarding 
underlying credit risk, CDSs feature a jump to default (binary) property, which is peculiar to this type 
of contract: a credit event implies a sudden and significant payment due from the protection seller. 
The remainder of this section focuses on single-name CDSs reported under EMIR to DTCC, which 
is the largest trade repository by market share. As in Section 2, we analyse DTCC’s trade-state 
report on all outstanding contracts on 02/11/15. 
3.1 Processing the data 
This subsection summarises the “processing” procedure that takes us from the raw dataset to one 
that is suitable for economically meaningful descriptive statistics. The processing procedure serves 
two major purposes. First, it allows us to identify and eliminate inconsistent or erroneous 
observations. Second, we focus on single-name CDS, for two main reasons. First, as noted by 
Augustin et al (2014), most studies on the CDS market focus on the single-name segment. 
Focusing on this market segment thus ensures comparability with existing studies. Second, the 
current regulatory technical standards (RTS) mandated by ESMA require the underlying of a 
                                                          
16  See for instance Barth, Carpio and Levine (2012) and the speech by then SEC Chairman Christopher Cox shortly after 
the default of Lehman Brothers. Also, Haldane (2009) highlights how uncertainty about Lehman’s exposures, together with 
uncertainties about the consequences of its defaults, exacerbated panic at the onset of the crisis. 
Section 3 
Credit default swaps 
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derivative to be identified via an International Securities Identification Number (ISIN), which is not 
possible for CDSs with indices and baskets as underlying.17 
The stock of all outstanding transactions in DTCC’s raw trade state report dated 02/11/15 amounts 
to 1,624,235. Before starting the processing procedure, we convert all notional positions to EUR 
using the exchange rates prevailing at market close on 02/11/15. This allows us to gauge the 
economic magnitudes of dropped observations, and to consistently aggregate transactions once 
the dataset is processed. 
The processing procedure is summarised in Table 7. The first column indicates the type of 
procedure conducted at each step. The second column reports the number of observations that is 
dropped; the third and fourth columns report, respectively, the gross notional (in euros) and the 
share of that gross notional in the total (at the time the observations are dropped). Categories 
above the middle horizontal line refer to systematic issues that need to be dealt with before 
analysing the data. The items below the line relate to observations which we eliminate for the 
purposes of our analysis, but which may be used in other types of analyses. 
Table 7 
Statistics of the processing procedure for CDS 
 # Obs. Notional (€bn) Notional (%)* 
Initial values 1,624,235 18,478* - 
Observation dropping    
Implausible values 1,122 538 2.91 
Incorrect ISIN 92,046 617 3.44 
Implausible notional 14,602 12 0.07 
Missing mark-to-market value 305,235 4,409 25.47 
Duplicates (trade IDs)    
 Inconsistent:    
  notional 1,764 34 0.26 
  counterparty ID 2,064 28 0.22 
  maturity date 316 5 0.04 
  intragroup flag 62 1 0.01 
  counterparty side 2,682 27 0.21 
  reference entity 7,520 52 0.40 
 De-duplication 145,083 1,294 10.15 
Non LEI counterparties 34,175 300 2.61 
Intragroup 187,985 2,869 25.70 
Missing reference entity 93,784 954 11.51 
Non-ISIN, non-index reference entity 18,356 184 2.51 
Index & basket CDS 96,711 3,463 48.41 
Total return swaps 3,213 30 0.83 
Final values 617,377 3,660 - 
Source: DTCC OTC credit derivatives dataset (based on the 02/11/15 trade state report). 
Note: The notional amount (in €bn and as a % of the total) for each row is calculated when the respective observations are dropped from the dataset 
                                                          
17  These contracts are simply identified with a “B” (basket) or an “I” (index). In our view, future technical standards should 
address this omission such that authorities are able to analyse the characteristics of basket and index CDS contracts, 
which represent a large and growing share of the CDS market. 
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The processing procedure starts by eliminating transactions deemed problematic due to unreliable 
reporting in terms of implausible notional (greater than €10bn and lower than €1,000 including 
negative and zero); transactions with unidentifiable reference entities; and transactions for which 
the mark-to-market value of the contract is missing. The next step drops observations identified as 
duplicates based on the trade ID of the transactions. We first drop transactions which appear three 
times. We identify a substantial number of duplicate observations in terms of trade IDs, given that 
many transactions involve two EU counterparties, both of which are subject to a reporting 
requirement under EMIR. Some of these observations present inconsistencies in terms of the 
notional reported; the IDs of the counterparties; the counterparty side (i.e. both reporting “Buy” or 
“Sell” side); the maturity date; the underlying reference entity; and the intragroup nature of the 
trade. We drop these inconsistent observations, which account for a relatively minor share of the 
total notional. From the remaining duplicate observations, we eliminate one to avoid double 
counting. Finally, we drop all transactions involving counterparties that are not identified by an LEI. 
Using the intragroup flag in the DTCC dataset and information from Orbis on entities’ global 
ultimate owner (GUO), we eliminate intragroup transactions. Around 12% of the remaining reports 
do not contain any information on the underlying reference entity. We discard these observations, 
together with those where the reference entity appears misreported. 
Among the remaining contracts, the single-name CDS market accounts for 87% in terms of 
transactions, but only around 52% in terms of notional. In contrast, contracts on indices and 
baskets represent 13% of transactions, and over 48% when weighted by notional. The larger 
notional for index products is in line with information from surveys.18 After dropping index and 
basket CDS, plus a minor share of total return swaps,19 we are left with 617,377 observations 
representing a total notional of approximately €3.7tn. The remainder of this section focuses on this 
subset of the data. 
3.2 Summary statistics of processed credit default swap data 
This section presents summary statistics of the single-name CDS market. These provide a “sanity 
check” as to whether the main features of the data are consistent with survey-based knowledge of 
the CDS market. In addition, the results deliver novel insights into the structure of the market 
thanks to the granularity of the EMIR dataset, paving the way for future research. 
As noted in the first section of the paper, under EMIR all EU counterparties engaging in derivatives 
trades are required to report them to trade repositories. However, the other side of CDS contracts is 
frequently taken by non-EU entities, which are therefore also present in our dataset. Chart 18 
depicts this graphically. We observe 655 unique reporting (EU-resident) entities. These EU 
counterparties report trades with a total of 2,915 counterparties, 424 of which are within the set of 
reporting entities (i.e. they are also EU entities). Under EMIR, contracts between two non-EU 
institutions are not subject to a reporting obligation, even if the underlying reference entity is an EU 
institution or sovereign. 
                                                          
18  See for instance the BIS OTC CDS data for single-name instruments. 
19  These represent credit derivatives that are not default swaps. 
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Chart 18 
Geographical structure of the reporting scheme under EMIR (CDS) 
 
Source: DTCC OTC credit derivatives processed single-name dataset (based on the 02/11/15 trade state report). 
Chart 19 depicts the share of outstanding contracts and the share of notional by currency. The 
overwhelming majority of contracts are denominated in USD or EUR. The predominance of USD-
denominated CDSs is even more apparent when considering gross notional instead of the number 
of transactions. CDSs denominated in JPY or GBP are also present, but in much less significant 
quantities. 
Chart 19 
Share of outstanding contracts (left) and associated gross notional (right) by currency 
 
Source: DTCC OTC credit derivatives processed single-name dataset (based on the processed 02/11/15 trade state report). 
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Chart 20 provides a breakdown of the currency 
of CDS contracts (x-axis), vis-à-vis the currency 
of the underlying security (y-axis).20 The 
currency of the contract does not always 
coincide with the currency of the underlying 
security. For instance, the second row of 
Chart 20 indicates that, among all underlying 
securities denominated in GBP, 80% of the 
associated CDS contracts are denominated in 
EUR. For securities denominated in “other” 
currencies, the associated CDS contracts are 
mostly denominated in either USD or EUR. For 
securities denominated in JPY, EUR, and USD, 
however, the vast majority of the associated 
CDS contracts are denominated in the same 
currency. 
The underlying reference securities can be 
grouped according to different criteria. In 
Chart 21, we depict breakdowns obtained by 
matching the reported ISIN with the sector classification provided by Bloomberg. While Bloomberg 
provides 12 different sectors, we keep only the five most significant ones, and aggregate the rest 
under “Other”.21 
Chart 21 
Share of outstanding contracts (left) and share of outstanding notional (right) by type of 
underlying reference entity 
 
Note: (left) the share of contracts and (right) the share of notional by sector of reference entity (using Bloomberg’s sector classification of ISINs: 
http://www.bloombergindexes.com/content/uploads/sites/3/2013/05/Index-Family-Methodology.pdf, p.10). Source: DTCC OTC credit 
derivatives processed single-name dataset (based on the processed 02/11/15 trade state report). 
                                                          
20  The currency of the underlying instrument has been retrieved from Bloomberg using the ISIN identifier. The distribution of 
currencies for the underlying instruments is as follows: 57% in USD, 30% in EUR, 6% in GBP, 5% in JPY, and the residual 
in “other”. 
21  This includes the following sectors: Asset Backed Securities, Basic Materials, Communications, Mortgage Securities, 
Technology, Utilities and a residual of Unidentified. 
Chart 20 
Notional currency of CDS contracts by 
currency of the underlying security 
 
Note: “USD” stands for US dollars, “JPY” for Japanese yen, “EUR” for 
euro, and “GBP” for British pound. 
Source: DTCC OTC processed single-name credit derivatives dataset 
(based on the processed 02/11/15 trade state report). 
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As can be seen, CDSs referenced on government debt or financial institutions account for the 
largest share of outstanding contracts and notional. The concentration in these two categories of 
reference entity reflects the fact that government debt and bank bonds represent the largest and 
most liquid segments of the fixed-income market. 
Chart 22 shows the distribution of effective dates across transactions. Relative to the IRS 
counterpart in Chart 8, we see greater concentration around 2014 and 2015. To a large extent this 
reflects the shorter average maturity of CDS contracts relative to IRS. Additionally, the use of 
compression in recent years amplifies the concentration of effective dates: by collapsing multiple 
outstanding contracts into a single (new) contract, the resulting new contracts exhibit more recent 
effective dates. 
Chart 23 shows the unweighted frequency distribution of original maturities across all trades. The 
distribution is right-skewed – much more so than the IRS counterpart shown in Chart 9. Almost 
35% of CDS contracts are written with a five-year maturity, thanks to the standardisation of CDS 
contracts that took place after the so-called “big bang”22. There is also a significant share of 
contracts with maturities of less than five years, and we also see bunching at the 10-year mark. 
More than 99% of the contracts have a maturity less than or equal to 10 years. 
Chart 23 
Frequency distribution of original maturities 
across trades 
 
Source: DTCC OTC credit derivatives dataset (based on the 02/11/15 
trade state report). 
                                                          
22  In April 2009 the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) introduced a number of documentation changes 
in its Credit Derivatives Determinations Committees and Auction Settlement CDS Protocol (the so-called "Big Bang" 
Protocol). The main purpose of the changes was to increase standardisation of the market, in particular the single-name 
portion, and in particular in relation to streamlining CDS settlements. 
Chart 22 
Frequency distribution of effective dates 
across trades 
 
Source: DTCC OTC credit derivatives single-name dataset (based on 
the processed 02/11/15 trade state report). 
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Chart 24 presents a breakdown of maturity by 
sector of the reference entity. Asset-backed and 
mortgage-backed securities represent the class 
of underlyings for which the distribution of 
maturities is concentrated in maturities in 
excess of 10 years.23 For CDSs written on 
governments, almost half of all transactions are 
accounted for by the five-year maturity bucket. 
For the other sectors, the distribution of 
maturities closely resembles the aggregate 
picture shown in Chart 23. 
In Chart 25, we plot the frequency distribution of 
gross notional amounts across transactions 
(with uneven bin sizes for the sake of 
presentational clarity and ease of comparison 
with the IRS data). The majority of trades (60%) 
in the processed single-name CDS data have a 
gross notional of €1-10m. Relative to the IRS 
dataset, we see a substantial share accounted 
for by small trades, with more than 25% of the 
trades involving a gross notional of less than 
€1m. At the other extreme, the share of 
contracts with a large notional is very small. 
We now proceed to analyse distributions related 
to the underlying reference entities. In this way 
we can confirm that the market is highly 
concentrated. There are a small number of 
reference entities on which a substantial 
amount of CDS contracts are written; at the 
same time, these contracts account for a large 
share of the total gross notional traded in the 
market. 
                                                          
23  Comparing Chart 23 with Chart 24, it is evident that the ABS/MS market plays a relatively minor role. In terms of notional 
these markets account for only around €35bn of gross notional (corresponding to 0.8% of the total). 
Chart 24 
Breakdown of maturity distribution by sector 
 
Note: ”ABS/MB” denotes Asset Backed Securities and Mortgage 
Securities; “others” includes Energy, Industrial, Consumer, Technology, 
Utilities, Basic Materials, Communications and other unidentified 
sectors, according to Bloomberg’s classification of ISINs, p.10. 
Source: DTCC OTC credit derivatives single-name dataset (based on 
the processed 02/11/15 trade state report). 
Chart 25 
Distribution of notional across trades 
 
Source: DTCC OTC credit default swap single-name dataset (based on 
the processed 02/11/15 trade state report). 
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In Chart 26, we categorise underlying reference 
entities by the number of CDS contracts written 
on them. In addition, for each bin, we compute 
the aggregate notional of the contracts related 
to the underlying references in the bin. For 
instance, the first bin labelled “0-10” groups all 
reference entities on which fewer than 10 
contracts are written. This bin shows that 
reference entities on which very few contracts 
are written account for a substantial number of 
CDS contracts (about 30%) but a minor share of 
gross notional. This reveals a high 
concentration of gross notional in a few 
underlying reference entities: those on which 
more than 1,000 contracts are written account 
for less than 10% of the transactions but almost 
60% of the total gross notional. 
Table 8 presents the number of contracts, 
gross notional and net notional positions, and 
the ratio of the latter two, by sector of the 
market participant. A negative (positive) net 
position indicates net selling (buying) of 
protection. We find that G16 dealers are net 
sellers of protection, although the net position 
is relatively small compared to the gross 
notional traded by this group. This low 
net/gross ratio reflects the intermediation role 
played by this sector. Banks, while also having 
a small net/gross ratio, are net buyers of 
protection. Other financial institutions (typically 
hedge funds and mutual funds) represent a 
substantial amount of protection bought, and at 
the same time feature the highest net/gross 
ratio (excluding the marginal “Other” category). 
Non-financial corporations are also net buyers of protection, though with a comparatively smaller 
net/gross ratio. Insurance and pension funds, on the other hand, have a relatively small net buying 
position. 
Chart 27 presents an unweighted distribution of net/gross ratios by type of market participant, 
providing a more detailed view of the last column of Table 8. Banks and G16 dealers essentially 
operate with matched books with respect to fundamental credit risk, whereas other sectors – in 
particular insurers and pension funds – exhibit more heterogeneity. 
Chart 26 
Distribution of contracts and associated 
notional across underlying references 
 
Source: DTCC OTC credit derivatives single-name dataset (based on 
the processed 02/11/15 trade state report). 
Table 8 
Summary of net and gross positions in 
CDSs by sector 
 
No of 
contracts 
Gross 
notional 
(EUR bn) 
Net 
notional 
(EUR bn) Net/Gross (%) 
G16 
dealers 
1,014,550 5890 -69.9 -1.2 
Banks 96,256 676 5.5 0.8 
Other 
financials 
63,810 264 53.0 20.1 
Non-
financials 
36,095 264 5.6 2.1 
Insurance 
and 
pension 
funds 
3,593 35 0.9 2.5 
Source: DTCC OTC credit derivatives single-name dataset (based on 
the processed 02/11/15 trade state report). 
Note: A negative (positive) net position indicates net selling (buying) of 
protection. 
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Chart 27 
Unweighted distribution of net/gross ratio 
 
Source: DTCC OTC credit derivatives single-name dataset (based on the processed 02/11/15 trade state report). 
Table 9 looks at the geographical dimension of 
protection buying/selling by banks and G16 
dealers in the CDS market for euro area (EA) 
sovereign reference entities. Regarding the 
grouping of countries, “domestic” collects all 
positions in which the country of the 
counterparty is the same as that of the 
reference entity (i.e. a bank in country X 
buying/selling protection on country X), 
whereas “EA exc. domestic” groups all 
positions taken by euro area counterparties in 
which the country of the counterparty differs 
from that of the reference entity (i.e. a bank in 
country X buying/selling protection on country 
Y). The distinction is made between positions 
aggregated at the LEI level as reported in the 
EMIR DTCC data, and positions aggregated at 
the level of the Global Ultimate Ownership 
(GUO) LEI hierarchy. 
It is first worth noting that these results suggest, at least at this level of aggregation, little wrong-way 
risk between banks and G16 dealers and their respective sovereigns, in particular at the LEI level. 
On the other hand, the buying/selling positions of EA banks and dealers on EA reference entities 
other than that of the same country tend to be considerably larger. Other EU banks and dealers 
also engage in substantial buying/selling of protection on EA reference entities, with a significant 
net selling position. 
When moving from the LEI aggregation to the GUO-LEI aggregation of counterparties, the decline 
in the net buying position (as well as gross buying and selling) of the “Other EU” counterparties is 
notable, as is the increase of both the US and Switzerland (in gross positions mostly) and Japan (in 
both net and gross positions). One explanation for these changes is that counterparties located in 
the latter countries use “Other EU” (typically UK) companies (that they ultimately own) in order to 
trade in the European sovereign CDS market. In sum – regardless of the aggregation in terms of 
Table 9 
Positions of banks and dealers on euro area 
sovereign reference entities, by country of 
counterparty 
(€ bn) 
 Based on LEI Based on GUO-LEI 
 Buy Sell Net Buy Sell Net 
Domestic 5.6 1.4 4.2 6.7 2.7 4.0 
EA exc. 
domestic 
108.0 115.0 -7.0 109.0 117.0 -8.0 
Other EU 225.0 222.0 3.0 59.2 59.3 -0.1 
US 83.0 95.3 -12.3 235.0 245.0 -10.0 
CH 7.5 8.1 -0.7 30.6 30.4 0.2 
JP 0.0 0.0 0.0 22.3 24.4 -2.1 
Other 1.3 1.7 -0.4 1.4 1.5 -0.1 
Source: DTCC OTC credit derivatives single-name dataset (based on 
the processed 02/11/15 trade state report). “Domestic” groups positions 
by counterparties with the same nationality as that of the reference entity 
(i.e. a bank in country X buying/selling protection on country X), “EA exc. 
domestic” groups positions by euro area counterparties with a nationality 
different from that of the reference entity (i.e. a bank in country X in the 
euro area buying/selling protection on country Y”. 
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LEI/GUO-LEI and regardless of the scarcity of wrong-way risk – banks and dealers are net sellers 
of protection on EA sovereign reference entities. 
Chart 28 shows a scatter plot comparing total 
assets and gross notional outstanding, by type 
of market participant (in logarithms for ease of 
comparison). As one would expect, the 
relationship between total assets and notional is 
positive: larger counterparties trade larger 
notional amounts. This holds irrespective of the 
type of market participant. Consistent with 
previous findings on global CDS data (Peltonen 
et al, 2014; D’Errico et al, 2016), non-financial 
corporations represent a limited fraction of CDS 
market participants, and do not have very high 
notional. Other financial institutions, conversely, 
represent a large segment; some individual 
other financial institutions have very large CDS 
positions. 
 
3.3 Network properties of outstanding credit default swap contracts 
Like interest rate swaps, credit default swaps are traded over-the-counter. Interesting insights can 
therefore be obtained by analysing the market from a network perspective. 
Chart 29 presents the degree distribution of the 
CDS network. It summarizes the number of 
counterparties with which each market 
participant interacts. We see that the market 
has a sparse structure: 40% of counterparties 
interact with only one other counterparty. 
Furthermore, around 80% of market participants 
feature five or fewer connections. On the other 
hand, a high number of connections are 
concentrated in only a few market participants, 
typically the dealers. 
Table 10 presents the matrix of bilateral CDS 
exposures expressed as shares of total notional 
by type of counterparty, aggregated across all 
reference entities in the sample.24 Entries in the 
matrix indicate the share of total notional that 
the row-sector buys (in protection) from the 
column-sector (which is the seller of protection). 
                                                          
24  A qualitatively similar matrix emerges if we compute the number of transactions instead of the notional. 
Chart 28 
Total assets versus notional, by sector of 
LEI 
 
Source: DTCC OTC credit derivatives single-name dataset (based on 
the processed 02/11/15 trade state report). 
Chart 29 
Degree distribution of the CDS network 
F(x ≤X) 
 
Source: DTCC OTC credit derivatives single-name dataset (based on 
the processed 02/11/15 trade state report). 
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As expected, almost 30% of all notional in the market is accounted for by trades between dealers. 
An additional 36% of notional is accounted for by transactions between banks and dealers on either 
the buy or sell side. Once more, the table shows that the CDS market is highly concentrated, with 
much of the activity taking place in a specific segment. These findings are also in line with previous 
work on CDS market microstructure (Peltonen et al, 2014; Cont and Minca, 2014). 
Table 10 
Matrix of share of interactions between market participants, weighted by notional 
Buy \ Sell G16 Dealers Banks 
Other 
financials ICPFs Non-financial Other Total 
G16 Dealers 29.5% 17.4% 7.1% 0.3% 4.2% 2.4% 60.9% 
Banks 18.5% 1.9% 0.9% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 21.3% 
Other 
financials 
8.2% 1.1% 0.4% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 10.0% 
ICPFs 0.4% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.5% 
Non-financial 4.4% 0.1% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4.6% 
Other 2.5% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.7% 
Total 63.5% 20.6% 8.6% 0.4% 4.4% 2.5% 100.0% 
Note: “Other” includes Government, Central Bank, CCPs and empty or unidentified sectors. The red squares refer to the intensity of the respective 
sector-to-sector relationship. 
Source: DTCC OTC credit derivatives single-name dataset (based on the processed 02/11/15 trade state report). 
Similar to the IRS dataset, we represent the CDS market graphically as a network in Chart 30. To 
do this, we select the network of exposures stemming from CDS contracts written on the 10th most 
traded reference entity (in terms of notional), which is a non-financial corporation belonging to the 
“Consumer” sector. As Chart 30 shows, the core of the network is composed of the G16 dealers 
and a few banks which trade with peripheral institutions and each other. Peripheral institutions are 
heterogeneous in type and mainly trade with a small subset of core institutions. This concentration 
of activity driven by few market participants is a feature consistent across other most actively traded 
reference entities. Furthermore, this result is also in line with the results of D’Errico et al. (2016), 
who study the global CDS network and show that the network structure across reference entities is 
relatively similar. 
As in Section 2, we construct the network by adding a link between two nodes (reporting LEIs) if 
there exists at least one CDS contract between them. We show the resulting network in Chart 30. 
The size of a given node indicates the total notional of CDS contracts with this node as a 
counterparty; for small notional values, we impose a minimum node size to ensure that nodes are 
visible. The colour of the node indicates its sector. The structure of the network is markedly 
different from the IRS counterpart shown in Chart 15. In particular, the intermediation role of the 
G16 dealers is much more pronounced. In addition, we observe three large banks and two “other 
financials” in intermediation roles for the reference entity considered. The periphery of the network 
is mostly composed of other financial institutions. While the role of banks and other financial 
institutions as connectors may depend on the particular reference entity considered, the role of 
major dealers as connectors in the market is a consistent finding across reference entities. 
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Chart 30 
Network of gross notional links between counterparties in a subset of the CDS market 
(based on a representative reference entity) 
 
Note: Undirected unweighted network representation of gross CDS contracts for an arbitrarily chosen underlying reference. 
Source: DTCC OTC credit derivatives single-name dataset (based on the processed 02/11/15 trade state report). 
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Foreign exchange (FX) derivatives constitute the second-largest segment, in notional terms, of the 
OTC derivatives market, after interest rate derivatives. FX derivative contracts entail an obligation 
between two counterparties to exchange future cash flows in different currencies. They are an 
interesting object of study for three reasons. First, FX derivatives are not centrally cleared; to date, 
the market has escaped the central clearing requirements that have been applied or are in the 
process of being applied to most interest rate and credit derivatives, both in Europe and the US 
(Duffie, 2011). As such, the FX derivatives market has a markedly different network structure and 
susceptibility to contagion of counterparty credit risk. Second, as we shall see, FX derivatives 
typically have relatively short maturities; as such, daily transaction volumes outnumber those of 
interest rate derivatives, despite the latter having a much larger outstanding notional. Third, the 
number of counterparties that actively trade FX derivatives is much larger than that of interest rate 
and credit derivatives, the trading of which is dominated by banks and other financial institutions. 
Many FX derivatives are traded between banks and non-financial counterparties, as they allow 
NFCs to hedge expected future cash flows in different currencies. As such, the FX derivatives 
market provides for a closer link between the financial system and the real economy. Moreover, the 
relatively important role of NFCs in the market means that the average level of counterparties’ 
financial sophistication is lower than in the interest rate and credit derivatives markets. 
To aid comparison, our analysis of FX derivatives parallels that of interest rate and credit 
derivatives. We start by describing the cleaning procedure, by which we discard erroneous 
observations and focus the dataset on a single underlying (in this case EUR/USD). We then 
proceed to show summary statistics of that particular subset of the FX derivatives market. As in 
previous sections, we base our analysis on the DTCC trade state report from 02/11/2015. 
4.1 Processing the data 
More than 85% of FX derivatives are forward contracts. In the trade repositories' data these 
contracts are of two types: outright forwards and forward legs of FX swaps. An outright forward 
entails a contractual agreement to exchange two currencies at a pre-agreed future date and 
exchange rate. An FX swap entails an initial exchange of two currencies (typically on a spot date or 
before), together with a commitment to a reverse exchange at a pre-agreed future date and rate 
(forward leg). Although outright forwards and FX swaps entail different market risks, there is 
unfortunately no information in the EMIR data that allows us to distinguish these two types. 
In the subsequent analysis, we focus our attention on these two types of FX forward contracts. 
Furthermore, we focus on a specific type of contract: EUR/USD forwards. In this subsection, we 
provide an overview of the data processing procedure that allows us to transition from the raw 
dataset, which includes over six million outstanding contracts (similar to the total number of interest 
rate derivatives), to the subset of FX forwards on the EUR/USD cross. 
The data processing procedure is described in Table 11. As in previous tables, the first column 
describes the various steps followed, while column 2 reports the number of observations that are 
discarded at each step. Column 3 reports the associated gross notional amount that is dropped at 
each step, and column 4 the share of that step in the total gross notional. 
Section 4 
Foreign exchange forwards 
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Table 11 
Statistics of the processing procedure for FXDs 
 # Obs. Notional (€bn) Notional (%)* 
Initial values 6,609,385 68,800 - 
Observation dropping    
Implausible values 2,875 -  
Negative/zero notional 145,040 -  
No counterparty side 53,910 358 0.52 
Implausible execution date 99,854 1,130 1.65 
Missing tenor 38,619 395 0.54 
Missing mark-to-market value 1,278,525 16,500 24.65 
Irretrievable currency pair 184,924 978 1.94 
Irretrievable contractual exchange rate 78,629 747 1.51 
Duplicates (trade IDs)    
 Inconsistent:    
  notional 161,672 1,240 2.55 
  counterparty ID 15,518 219 0.46 
  maturity date 9,214 51 0.11 
  intragroup flag 5,408 15 0.03 
 De-duplication 611,749 4,621 9.79 
Non LEI counterparties 512,714 1,890 4.44 
Non Forward 477,583 10,800 26.54 
Non "EUR/USD" 2,333,006 22,000 73.61 
Intragroup 119,249 1,060 13.44 
Final values 480,796 6,829 - 
Source: DTCC OTC foreign exchange derivatives dataset (based on the 02/11/15 trade state report). 
Note: The notional amount (in €bn and as a % of the total) for each row are calculated when the respective observations are dropped from the 
dataset. All notional amounts are reported in euro after conversion using exchange rates on 02/11/15. 
As in previous tables, we start by dropping observations with extreme values for the notional 
amount (i.e. greater than €10bn and lower than €1,000). Next, we discard contracts where the field 
“counterparty side” is missing. After this, we apply consistency checks associated with the double 
reporting obligation. We discard triplicates as well as observations where the matching of two 
reports pertaining to the same transaction (based on the unique trade identifier) reveals 
inconsistencies between those two reports. Finally, we drop one observation per pair of matched 
transactions, and also delete transactions where at least one of the counterparty identifiers is not 
an LEI. Table 11 lists the number of observations that are dropped at each step. 
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Next, we restrict the dataset to FX forwards. To 
this end, we drop FX swaps (which are mostly 
retail products) and options. We also focus the 
analysis only on EUR/USD forwards, which is 
the most frequently traded cross, as Chart 31 
shows. This removes nearly three million 
transactions from the dataset. The final dataset 
consists of 480,796 EUR/USD forward 
transactions. 
 
 
 
 
4.2 Summary statistics of processed foreign exchange forward data 
This subsection presents summary statistics for the subset of 480,796 observations that are 
identified as EUR/USD forwards. 
About 90% of the 480,796 outstanding EUR/USD forwards on 02/11/15 were executed in 2015 
(Chart 32). FX forwards have a much shorter average original maturity than interest rate 
derivatives, which average about 10 years, and credit derivatives, which average five years on 
execution. Looking at the distribution of maturities (Chart 33), we see that it is positively skewed, 
with the vast majority of forwards having an original maturity of less than one year. We also see 
some degree of bunching – at the one, two, three, six and twelve month points – indicating some 
degree of standardisation in the market. However, in terms of maturities, the market is considerably 
less standardised than that of credit derivatives. 
Chart 33 
Frequency distribution of original maturity 
across trades 
(in days) 
 
Source: DTCC OTC foreign exchange derivatives dataset (based on the 
02/11/15 trade state report). 
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Chart 31 
Breakdown of underlying benchmark 
 
Source: DTCC OTC foreign exchange derivatives dataset (based on the 
02/11/15 trade state report). 
Chart 32 
Frequency distribution of execution date 
across trades 
 
 
Source: DTCC OTC foreign exchange derivatives dataset (based on the 
02/11/15 trade state report). 
EUR/GBP
EUR/USD
GBP/USD
OTHER EUR pairs
OTHER USD pairs
OTHER pairs
USD/CNY
USD/JPY
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
ESRB 
Occasional Paper Series No 11/ September 2016 
 
Foreign exchange forwards 38 
Zooming in, we see that the distribution of original maturities varies by sector (Chart 34). Notably, 
non-financial firms have a more uniform distribution, suggesting that they prefer to hedge at 
somewhat longer maturities than the market average. Insurance and pension funds, by contrast, 
exhibit a clear preference for 90-day trades. 
Chart 34 
Frequency distribution of original maturity across counterparty type 
(in days) 
 
Source: DTCC OTC foreign exchange derivatives dataset (based on the 02/11/15 trade state report). Truncated at 400 days. 
Another sense in which foreign exchange derivatives differ from interest rate derivatives is in their 
average gross notional. Chart 35 shows that about 85% of FX forwards have a gross notional of 
less than €10m – similar, in fact, to credit derivatives. By contrast, recall that the modal notional 
category for interest rate derivatives is €10-50m. 
Charts 36 plots the ratio of the contractual exchange rate to the Bloomberg benchmark rate 
prevailing on the execution date. There is considerable dispersion around the average, reflecting 
intraday volatility in exchange rates as well as price discrimination across different clients. Indeed, 
the significant presence of relatively less sophisticated non-financial firms in the FX derivatives 
market, combined with the over-the-counter structure of that market, enhances the scope for price 
discrimination.  
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Chart 36 
Distribution of contractual rate over 
Bloomberg benchmark rate 
 
 
Source: DTCC OTC foreign exchange derivatives dataset (based on the 
02/11/15 trade state report). For visual clarity the histogram is truncated 
at 0.98 and 1.02. 
 
4.3 Network properties of outstanding foreign exchange forward contracts 
Chart 37 presents the degree distribution off the EUR/USD forwards network. The network is more 
sparse than the CDS network, but similar to that of the IRD network: 90% of market participants 
have five or fewer unique counterparties. As with IRD, there is also a long tail of market participants 
with many unique counterparties, but in the case of FXD this tail is thinner. 
Table 11 sheds further light on “who trades with whom” based on Orbis’s sector classifications. The 
role of dealers in the FX forwards market is smaller as a proportion of the overall market than it is 
for IRDs and, especially, CDSs. On the other hand, other financial and non-financial firms are 
relatively more important. Moreover, when we count trades (rather than weight them by notional), 
the relative significance of non-financial firms is even more apparent: as of 02/11/15, they have 
132,556 outstanding EUR/USD forward contracts, compared with 258,053 for the G16 dealers, 
268,602 for banks, and 160,048 for other financial firms. Insurance and pension funds are relatively 
less important in the FX derivatives market: they had just 4,841 outstanding EUR/USD trades on 
02/11/15, compared with 7,324 interest rate derivative transactions. 
0
.0
1
.0
2
.0
3
.98 .99 1 1.01 1.02
Chart 35 
Frequency distribution of gross notional 
across trades 
(in euros) 
 
Source: DTCC OTC foreign exchange derivatives dataset (based on the 
02/11/15 trade state report). Horizontal axis is given in millions of euros. 
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We conclude the analysis of the FX forwards 
market by visualising the network of outstanding 
contracts. This is shown in Chart 38. To 
construct the visualisation, we count 
outstanding contracts between any two given 
counterparties. The width of each link 
corresponds to the total gross notional 
outstanding between those two counterparties, 
while the size of each node corresponds to that 
counterparty’s gross notional outstanding 
across all other counterparties. 
The lack of central clearing in the FX forwards 
market results in a complex network of 
connections, with a core of about 15 banks at 
the centre of the network. The network is 
therefore more similar to that of CDSs, as both 
correspond to a core-periphery structure with 
banks at the core. However, the composition of 
the periphery is somewhat different in the FX 
forwards market: as we saw earlier, non-financial firms are relatively more important. 
Table 12 
Matrix of share of interactions between market participants, weighted by notional 
Buy \ Sell G16 Dealers Banks 
Other 
financials ICPFs Non-financial Other Total 
G16 Dealers 11.3% 13.5% 8.0% 0.5% 3.2% 0.9% 37.4% 
Banks 14.6% 9.6% 3.5% 0.3% 2.2% 0.6% 30.8% 
Other 
financials 
9.0% 6.2% 2.8% 0.7% 0.3% 0.1% 19.0% 
ICPFs 1.3% 1.0% 2.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4.8% 
Non-financial 3.5% 2.8% 0.5% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 7.0% 
Other 0.7% 0.4% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.1% 
Total 40.4% 33.6% 17.3% 1.5% 5.7% 1.6% 100.0% 
Note: This table includes only trades which are not centrally cleared.  
Source: DTCC OTC foreign exchange derivatives dataset (based on the 02/11/15 trade state report). 
Chart 37 
Degree distribution of the FX network 
F(x ≤X) 
 
Note: This chart does not show the 10 institutions with the largest 
number of counterparties (for presentational clarity). 
Source: DTCC OTC foreign exchange derivatives dataset (based on the 
02/11/15 trade state report). 
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Chart 38 
Network of gross notional links between counterparties in a subset of the FXD market 
(based on EUR/USD FX forwards) 
 
Note: Undirected unweighted network representation of EUR/USD forward contracts. Source: DTCC OTC foreign exchange derivatives dataset 
(based on the 02/11/15 trade state report). 
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